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the bringing of an action." Id. at 257,
577 A.2d at 68. The court explained that
the Joneses could only succeed in their
suit if they could prove that Dr. Speed
had been negligent within the five years
prior to filing the complaint. Thus, the
, doctor could not be held liable for any
negligence occurring before that period
and, as such, he was protected to the
extent that the legislature intended
under §5-109. Id. at 257, 577 A.2d at 68.
Finally, Dr. Speed argued that the
long-standing prohibition against splitting a cause of action prevented the
Joneses from bringing suit. He argued
that had they brought suit for the initial
act of negligence occurring on July 17,
1978, their claim for relief would have
necessarily included damages resulting
from all subsequent negligent acts when
her tumor remained undiscovered. Thus,
because the Joneses were precluded
from bringing suit on the initial negligence and the initial negligence was so
intertwined with the later negligence,
to allow the Joneses to proceed on the
later counts was the same as permitting
them to split their cause of action. Id. at
257-58, 577 A.2d at 68.
The court agreed that splitting a cause
of action is prohibited in order "to prevent multiplicity of litigation and to
avoid the vexation, costs and expenses
incident to more than one suit on the
same cause of action." Ex Parte Carlin,
212 Md. 526, 532-33, 129 A.2d 827
(1957) quoted injones, 320 Md. at 258,
577 A.2d at 68 (1990). The flaw with
Speed's reasoning, noted the court, was
that the rules prohibiting splitting a
cause of action, and application of res
judicata principles only apply to situations where the plaintiff has in fact
brought suit and a final adjudication has
occurred. jones, 320 Md. at 259, 577
A.2d at 69. In the Jones' situation the
court explained that prior adjudication
addressing the physician's negligence
had never occurred. As such, the court
concluded, the Joneses were not precluded from bringing suit as to any acts
of negligence occurring within five years
of filing their complaint. Id.
Throughjones v. speed, 320 Md. 249,
577 A.2d 64 (1990), the Court of Appeals of Maryland has clarified what
constitutes a separate cause of action for
negligence and thereby starts the accrual
of Maryland's statute of limitations for

medical malpractice. Where a physician
repeatedly misdiagnoses his patient's
condition due to negligence, each visit
with the doctor may constitute a separate cause of action and thus, begin a new
statute of limitations.
- Michael P. CasEry

In re Billman: DISPOSITION OF
SUBSTITUTE ASSETS
POSSESSED BY THIRD PARTY
AND SUBJECT TO RICO
FORFEITURE MAY BE ENJOINED
In a case of first impression, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that it was within
the power of the district court to enjoin
the disposition of substitute assets pending criminal trial or forfeiture under
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations laws (RICO). The court held
that the statute, codified at 18 U.S.c.
1963, prohibited a defendant from avoiding forfeiture of his substitute assets. As
a result, transfer of a RICO target's assets
to a third person who did not qualify as a
bona fide purchaser for value did not
place the assets beyond the court's
jurisdiction. u.s. v. McKinnEry, 915 F.2d
916 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit
determined that Congress intended Section 1963 to be construed liberally in
order to effectuate its remedial purpose.
The purpose, in the context of McKinnEry, was to preserve the defendant's
substitute assets for ultimate forfeiture
upon conviction.
Tom). Billman, implicated in the failure of a savings and loan, was indicted
for racketeering, fraud, and conspiracy
to commit mail and wire fraud. Before
the indictment was issued, however, Billman became a fugitive. After Billman's
flight, Barbara A. McKinney, an alleged
co-conspirator, received a number of
cryptic telephone calls from Billman's
London attorney and from Billman himself. The purpose of these conversations
was to arrange a wire transfer of approximately $500,000 from the attorney to
McKinney. In addition, McKinney agreed
to accept $50,000 from William C.
McKnew in order to discharge a debt
that McKnewowed to Billman. The debt
was listed among Billman's assets.
At the commencement of the action,
the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland entered a tempo-

rary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting McKinney from disposing of the
$550,000. McKinnEry, 915 F.2d at 919.
The court subsequently held a hearing
to determine the validity of the TRO,
and to rule on a motion by the United
States requesting an injunction restraining disposition of the funds pending the
forfeiture proceedings. Id.
The district court vacated the TRO
and denied the government's motion for
an injunction, reasoning that section
1963 makes only those assets which the
government proves are connected to
the fugitive's alleged racketeering activity subject to pretrial restraint. Id. The
court's decision was based on the government's inability to trace $22,000,000
deposited by the conspirators in Swiss
bank accounts to the assets held by
McKinney. Specifically, the lower court
ruled that the government had failed to
prove that the funds in question were
actual RICO proceeds, and further determined that after the wire transfer, the
funds belonged to McKinney. Id.
Believing that a more liberal reading
of the statute was appropriate, the court
of appeals held that an injunction should
have been issued. Id. at 919-20. Compelled to follow the lower court's findings of fact the court treated the questioned funds as legitimate, despite its
own opinion to the contrary. Id. at 920.
Noting that under RICO the money was
still subject to forfeiture as substitute
assets, the court held that an injunction
was proper against a third party who did
not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for
value. Thus, by determining that McKinney was not a bona fide purchaser, the
court held that the TRO was proper. Id.
at 921.
In its analysis of § 1963 (a)( 1) and
(3), the court recognized that a forfeiture proceeding against funds derived
from RICO criminal activity is "an in
personam proceeding against the defendant, and the forfeiture constitutes partial punishment of the offense." McKinnEry, 915 F.2d at 920.
Furthermore, amended section 1963
( m ) provides for the forfeiture of substitute assets when actual RICO proceeds
are unavailable. Subsection (m) specifically provides that "[iJfanyofthe property described in subsection (a), as a
result of any act or omission of the
defendant ... (3) has been placed be-
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yond the jurisdiction of the courtj ... the
court shall order the forfeiture of any
other property of the defendant .... "
McKinney, 915 F.2d at 920. Because Billman was alleged to have placed the misappropriated funds in Swiss banks, beyond the court's jurisdiction, the Fourth
Circuit held that the district court could
have properly ordered forfeiture of Billman's substitute assets after his conviction.ld.
Under the court's reasoning, McKinney's possession of Billman's substitute
assets would not alter the government's
entitlement to forfeiture after conviction. The court observed that McKinney
had presented insufficient evidence to
meet the requirements of section 1963
( c). Specifically, it was not shown that
she was "a bona fide purchaserfor value
of ... [the] property [in question] who at
the time of purchase was reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this
section." Id.
Given its finding that the funds in
McKinney's possession would be within
the district court's jurisdiction following Billman's conviction, the court
turned to the remaining question of

whether the substitute assets could be
restrained pending trial. Id
Section 1963(d)(I)(A) authorized
the court, " [u ]pon application of the
United States ... [to] take any ... action
to preserve the availability of property
described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under this section," subject to certain procedural requirements. The court
determined that the purpose of this section was to prevent the disposal of property which, upon conviction of a RICO
defendant, would be subject to forfeiture.ld. at 921. In order to achieve this
purpose, a liberal construction of section 1963 was necessary, which required
the court to read subsections (d)( 1)
(a) and (m) together. Id
Applying this liberal construction, the
court of appeals held that "the pretrial
restraining provisions of 1963 [did] not
permit a defendant to thwart the operation of forfeiture laws by absconding
with RICO proceeds and then transferring his substitute assets to a third person who [did] not qualify as a bona fide
purchaser for value." Id.
In McKinney, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered for the first time whether a de-

fendant's substitute assets could be restrained pending criminal trial or forfeiture under RICO. By construing section 1963 liberally, the court held that a
defendant's assets could be restrained if
transferred to a person not qualifying as
a bona fide purchaser for value. This
reasoning was found to apply even where
the assets were placed outside the jurisdiction of the court.
The court's ruling has identified the
broad reaching effect of section 1963 to
freeze funds derived from activities RICO
proscribes. The court has acted to ensure
that even substitute proceeds could not
easily be placed out of the reach of both
the judiciary and the government officials charged with strict enforcement of
the statute. In so doing, the Fourth Circuit guaranteed that justice was not easily evaded. Importantly, the court was
the first at the federal circuit level to
hold that a defendant's substitute assets
could be restrained pending trial, an
issue which has yet to be addressed by
the Supreme Court.
- Charles Szczesny
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